



MSTP OBSERVATIONS

MST
P





PURPOSE

**MST
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- To review and discuss MSTP observations gathered over the last 10 years





OPERATIONAL DESIGN

MST

Direct

Visualize

Describe

Battlefield Framework

Deep, Close, Rear
(Single Battle)
Main Effort
Reserve
Security

Warfighting Functions
Integrated Planning

OPORD

METT-T
Decisive/Shaping
Sustainment

CBAE
&
Guidance

Intent


CCIRs

Battlespace

Centers
of Gravity



Battle Staff and OPT



Conceptual

Functional

Detailed

The Planning
Hierarchy



Execution



COMMANDER'S INTENT

MST

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
- Often written by staff officers and approved by CoS (Who writes it?)
- Method often restatement of CONOPS - overshadows the Purpose
- Is not refined as the situation evolves

- Purpose Why?
- Method “How he envisions achieving a decision”
- End State Picture of the future



CENTERS OF GRAVITY

- Thoughts on Centers of Gravity don't always address enemy or friendly Critical Vulnerabilities
- Friendly COGs viewed as a resource to be protected instead of the principal source of strength to be applied decisively against enemy critical vulnerabilities






BATTLESPACE

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- MEF and MSC AO often assigned without regard to capability to conduct all Warfighting Functions within assigned AO
- Real estate/terrain management often not thought through
- Lack of understanding of interrelationship of AO and airspace






CCIRs

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- **Not linked to commander's decision**
- **CCIRs not disseminated in a manner conducive to awareness, recognition or reporting**
- **Rarely updated to reflect changes in the battlespace and tactical situation**
- **HHQ's CCIRs neither tracked nor reported - *Awareness is the key.***



COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE



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- **Little or no refinement (change) of initial planning guidance**
- **Fails to address the Commander's vision of Decisive Action which will focus the planning effort**





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
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DECISIVE & SHAPING ACTIONS

MST

- Decisive action for the operation not clearly articulated
 - MSC commanders and staffs do not understand their role in either achieving or supporting the decisive action
- Shaping actions planned/executed without regard to the *decisive action*
- Shaping plan not developed in sufficient detail






SINGLE BATTLE

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- Lack of understanding of the deep, close and rear construct as it relates to the single battle
- Commander's Intent *fails to accurately articulate the purpose* of the operation to promote unity of effort in the single battle
- Loss of focus on the enemy




MSC CONOPS ≠ MAGTF CONOPS



MAIN & SUPPORTING EFFORTS

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
- No linkage between the designation of main effort and decisive action
- Preplanned shifting of the main effort not tied to decisive action
- Main effort not sufficiently “weighted” for success
- Supporting efforts fail to understand their role in ensuring the success of the main effort





USE OF THE RESERVE

- Reserve not resourced to perform assigned missions (Afterthought)
- Reserve *overtaxed* with multiple missions, or already committed with O/O missions






OPT/STAFF INTERACTION

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- Insufficient principal staff involvement in the OPT
 - Principal staff tendency to delegate and disappear
- Principal staff officers often lack awareness/ understanding of their role relative to their representative in the OPT
- OPT Reps lack rank/experience/expertise to accurately represent sections/commands
- Missing OPT Reps

Staff Reps

G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
G-5
G-6



Liaison Officers

Adjacent / Supporting

DIV

ACE

CSSE

Coalition / Allies


SME



IPB

**MST
P**

- **IPB process not understood and used effectively by the entire staff**
 - Only the MCOO is produced
 - Products not used in COA Development and Wargame
 - Not updated




IPB Process



DETAILED PLANNING

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- Failure to use the warfighting functions and IO as part of the framework for integrated planning
- Planning is “stove-piped”
- COA lacks sufficient detail going into COA Wargame - COA ends up being *developed* in the wargame and *tested* in execution
- Friendly and Enemy COGs/CVs ignored in COA Development




A complete MEF Course of Action
Not just a GCE CONOPS



INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

MST

- Staff/operators do not adequately understand IM requirements **Planning** so that technical support personnel can construct the appropriate IM architecture
- IM requirement recognized but seldom addressed with a **cohesive plan** - hinders Commander's decision making
- IM plan is most effective when the CoS is directly involved - IMO works for CoS
- Staff officers fail to recognize their role as information managers
- Too much raw data reported to the commander






INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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- **Lack of IO expertise resident in the Marine Corps**
- **Failure to integrate IO planning efforts - results in stove-piped planning**
 - IO plan not reflected in COA; not adequately tested in wargame
- **Unrealistic expectations for success**
- **Difficult to assess**




INTEGRATED IO PLANNING



FIRES

**MST
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- **Fires not linked to Decisive Action**
 - Main Effort/Decisive Action not weighted with Fires
 - Shaping not linked to setting conditions for Decisive Action
- **Fires not linked with Maneuver**
 - Priority/timing of Fires not linked to Scheme of Maneuver
- **Failure to coordinate Fire Support Plan with Collection Plan, IO Plan and Assessment Process**



USMC TARGETING PROCESS




INTELLIGENCE


MST

- **Enemy COG/CV, MLCOA & MDCOA not revised as additional information/analysis becomes available**
- **Estimative intelligence presented and accepted as descriptive intelligence**
- **HVT analysis lacking or not properly used**


**ROUGH CUT
EVENT
TEMPLATE**



**INTELLIGENCE
UPDATE**



**REFINED &
PRIORITIZED
THREAT COAs**





COLLECTION PLAN

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- Collection planning and priorities not aligned with MEF COA and CCIRs
- Failure to plan for *redundant* methods of collection
- Unrealistic expectations of external collection resources





BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION

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- **Failure to address battlefield circulation/movement control**
- **Failure to address resource shortfalls for battlefield circulation/movement control**





TERMINOLOGY

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- Lack of understanding of military terms (e.g. defeat vs. destroy) often leads to an MSC being given the “wrong” task
- Failure to recognize the time and resource implications (as well as risk) associated with military terms
- Inconsistent use of terms (seize-secure-occupy)

**Say what you mean...
and mean what you say.**

**“...but perhaps even more importantly -
know what you’re saying”**



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
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
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
Execution



ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

**MST
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- ***Different versions of orders used in execution***
- **Sections of orders or changes to orders posted on various web pages or sites to be pulled vice issued or pushed**
- **Planning that occurs in the OPT fails to make it to the order**
- **Failure to conduct orders reconciliation/orders crosswalk**





TRANSITION

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- Transition brief slides being used as authoritative documents and are often in conflict with the OPORD
- Inadequate transition of the plan from FOPS to COPS
- Ineffective rehearsals and drills conducted by MEFs as tools to assist in transition






ASSESSMENT

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- ***Fail to understand assessments role in SA and decision making***
- **Fail to develop assessment process in planning**
 - MEF/MSCs fail to organize for assessment or assign assessment responsibilities
- **MOE not developed for Tasks or supported by collection plan**





QUESTIONS?

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